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I.  Introduction
Many countries have introduced market forces into previously highly regulated
and public-sector-dominated health care sectors. The goal is to improve their efficiency
and responsiveness. It is hoped that competitive forces will inspire insurers and providers
to strive for more cost-effective treatment options and forms of health care organization.
Countries introducing such reforms include, for example, Belgium, Colombia, the Czech
Republic, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, and Switzerland
(van de Ven and Ellis 1999; Saltman and Figueras 1997). A stronger role of competition
has also been debated in the US, particularly regarding the Medicare program.
Most nations also recognize, however, the many limitations of free-market
competition in the health sector.  These limitations arise predominantly from asymmetry
of information, in particular the fact that many important dimensions of quality health
care are difficult to observe, monitor, and motivate. Many socially important efforts
cannot be written into health care contracts, either to assure adequate levels of desired
efforts or to proscribe undesired efforts.  In the tradition of Arrow (1963), we can say that
there is an important missing market, the market for effort-contingent payments to health
care providers. Provider competition to attract consumers can motivate some efforts, but
consumers frequently lack sufficient information and market power to be discriminating
purchasers of high quality, low cost services.  In this “second best” situation, competition
can lead to socially undesirable results, such as quality distortions to attract profitable and
deter unprofitable patients. Concern about such effects has led many policymakers to
doubt the effectiveness and desirability of increasing competition in health insurance and
delivery markets.
Recent developments in the theory of optimal health insurance-provider payment
systems, such as Ma and McGuire (1997) [hereafter MM], take the important step of
considering the incentive effects of competition. But they do not highlight the
implications of multiple dimensions of provider effort and how this interacts with
competitive pressures and financial incentives. This paper seeks to fill this gap in the2
literature.
1  The theory builds upon MM and Frank, Glazer and McGuire (2000) by
acknowledging that health care provider input to the health production process has many
dimensions, and illustrating that this multi-dimensionality can have important policy
implications.  Since there is more than one kind of effort or “task” that the provider/agent
can engage in for the patient/principal (or the payer/principal), the paper introduces a
“multitask” principal-agent model into the provider payment framework.
The seminal work on multitask principal-agent theory is due to Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991).
2  This theory is particularly appropriate for analyzing incentives for
agents called upon to perform many different tasks that are difficult to quantify, such as
health care providers making intricate treatment decisions. Ma (1994) has applied the
multitasking framework to provider payment systems, but abstracts from imperfect
substitutability of efforts or possible effort complementarity and its implications, as
highlighted here.
3 Provider competition also falls outside the scope of Ma’s analysis.
4
Others have modeled payment incentives and policy instruments to combat risk selection
(e.g., Lewis and Sappington 1999) and the effects of provider competition (e.g., Ellis
1998). But to the best of our knowledge, no one previously has focused on how
competition among providers interacts with payment system incentives when the
allocation of provider effort among multiple ‘tasks’ is noncontractible.
“Multitasking” for health care providers can be understood from several points of
view. Medical professionals often “wear many hats”. In addition to clinical care, there
may be administrative and managerial responsibilities within a group practice or hospital,
teaching and supervision tasks, as well as research and ongoing upgrading of technical
skills.  Doctors serve as “double agents”, beholden both to patients on one hand and to
their own group practice, hospital, or health plan employer on the other.
                                                
1 This model illuminates and formalizes the central message of “Lesson 3” in Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000):
“When consumer identity affects costs, competition is a mixed blessing.   Allowing individuals to choose
among competing health insurance plans can allocate people to appropriate plans and provide incentives for
efficient provision. But it can also bring with it adverse selection…and gives plans incentives to distort their
offerings to be less generous on care for the sick” (Table 10).
2 For a recent overview of work on multitasking, see Prendergast (1999), pp. 21-29.
3 Ma assumes that cost control and quality enhancement efforts are perfect substitutes in the provider's cost-
of-effort function.3
The multiple tasks that a provider engages in have often been modeled as one of
two broad categories of “effort,” such as cost control and quality-improvement effort
(e.g., Ma 1994; Hart Shleifer and Vishny 1997). But even treating a specific condition for
a specific patient can involve multiple tasks. A surgeon's work on a case might include
reviewing patient records, having a preoperative office visit (to make diagnoses and
discuss the benefits and risks of surgery), writing operative notes, performing the surgery,
and then following up with postoperative care to treat complications and/or to monitor
recovery. The efforts involved in different tasks may differ in their monitorability and in
how they relate to each other and to formal treatment (i.e., either through a substitute or
complementary relationship). For example, there may be economies of scale and scope
involved with reviewing several patients' records and preparing staff for a set of particular
services, or communicating with other professionals about certain kinds of cases.
Alternatively, time and attention devoted to one patient may directly reduce the time
available for treating a different case.
In research supporting the adoption of the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale
(RBRVS) for physician payment, Hsiao et al. (1988a,b,c) analyzed what constitutes
physician “work” (common parlance for “disutility of effort”) through a survey of
physicians in 18 specialties based on carefully crafted clinical vignettes. Since physician
work includes “diverse tasks” (Hsiao et al. 1988b: 2350) and aspects of work are “often
fragmented and intermingled with other activities” (Hsiao et al. 1988a: 882), the
researchers asked surveyed physicians to evaluate work involved in separate phases of
preservice, intraservice, and postservice care.
The RBRVS researchers found physician intraservice work to be a function of
four dimensions: time; mental effort and judgment; technical skill and physical effort; and
stress (arising from uncertainty regarding diagnosis and treatment and risk of iatrogenic
harm to the patient). All four components were important for all specialties, and seemed
to be partial substitutes in terms of providers' disutility cost-of-effort.
5  In other words, a
                                                                                                                                                
5 The RBRVS researchers estimated total work as a Cobb-Douglas function of these four effort dimensions,
deriving specialty-specific elasticities of work with respect to each dimension.  In all cases the estimated
elasticities were positive and significant.4
physician may exert the same level of total work (disutility) for a short but intense and
stressful procedure as for a longer but less mentally and physically demanding
procedure.
6 Similarly, two procedures requiring about equal time may involve very
different amounts of “work.” For example, although orthopedic surgeons estimated that a
“comprehensive office visit for initial evaluation of 48-year-old man with recurrent low-
back pain radiating to the leg” and “decompresssion of carpal tunnel in 48-year-old
woman, unilateral, ambulatory surgery unit” would both require about half an hour, the
latter calls for significantly more mental and physical effort and risk, and therefore
embodies almost twice the amount of “work” (Hsiao et al. 1988c: 2365).
The RBRVS study underscores that important aspects of physician effort are
fundamentally noncontractible (e.g., mental effort) and interact with other efforts a
provider undertakes. The estimated relationships suggest that the marginal effort cost of
mental effort (i.e., the derivative of work with respect to mental effort) increases with the
time devoted to the case. Quite intuitively, sustaining high mental effort for longer
periods is more difficult than for shorter periods. Similarly, the marginal effort cost of
physical effort is increasing in the level of mental effort.
Clearly, then, quality care involves multiple aspects of effort or multiple tasks,
and certain aspects of physician effort, such as mental effort and judgment, are
fundamentally noncontractible. The multitasking approach warns that “generally, the
desirability of providing incentives for any one activity decreases with the difficulty of
measuring performance in any other activities that make competing demands on the
agent’s time and attention” (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991: 26).  For example, to the
extent that many important dimensions of quality cannot be measured or contracted upon,
it is less desirable to give strong incentives for measurable quality indicators that compete
for the provider’s attention. If appropriate allocation of physician effort across different
                                                
6 For example, specialists in internal medicine rated the work involved in an “initial office evaluation of a
37-year-old generally well man” to be very similar to that of a “hospital visit, day 3 following admission,
65-year-old man with uncomplicated myocardial infarction, established patient”; the hospital visit would be
much shorter (18 vs. 34 minutes) but involve significantly more mental effort and risk. An additional
illustration comes from pediatrics, where although a “comprehensive well-child visit at 5 years, new
patient” would take 24 minutes compared to 14 minutes for “lumber puncture of 5-year-old for suspected
meningitis,” the latter calls for more mental and physical effort (and involves greater risk), so the estimated
“work” is slightly more (Hsiao et al. 1988c: 2364-2365).5
tasks is important for quality health care, payment systems should take this multitasking
into account.
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents a simple two-effort
(two-task) model of health care provider multitasking.  The remainder of the paper
analyzes the interaction of payment incentives and competition in light of provider multi-
tasking. First, a simple extension of the single-treatment model highlights how
competition reinforces provider sensitivity to financial incentives when choosing efforts.
Then we incorporate multitasking, professional ethics and supply-side cost sharing into
the Frank, Glazer and McGuire (2000) model of managed care and discuss the
implications for optimal provider payment, including optimal risk adjustment. Section IV
concludes.
II.  Provider Multitasking: A Two-Effort Model
To illustrate the implications of health care providers engaging in more than one
type of effort (multitasking), consider a simple two-effort case.  A provider may engage in
two tasks--or equivalently, exert two kinds of effort-- 1 e  and  2 e .  The “work” associated
with these efforts causes disutility of  ) , ( 2 1 e e G , increasing and convex in each individual
effort level.
7
The two efforts may complement or substitute for each other in the cost-of-effort
function.  If  1 e  and  2 e  compete for the provider’s energy and attention, then a higher
level of one effort will increase the marginal cost of the other effort: when  0 12 > G ,  1 e
and  2 e  are cost-of-effort substitutes. Alternatively, a higher level of  1 e  may make
increasing  2 e  easier (i.e.,  0 12 < G ), in which case  1 e  and  2 e  are cost-of-effort
complements. For example, the RBRVS study (Hsiao et al. 1988a,b,c) found that
physicians considered mental and physical effort to be cost-of-effort substitutes. The
marginal effort cost of physical effort was increasing in the level of mental effort.
Although this was generally true across all specialties, the elasticity of work with respect
to different efforts differed across specialties. For example, the elasticity of work with
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respect to mental effort was estimated to be 0.414 for radiology, compared to 0.236 for
general surgery; whereas the elasticity of work with respect to physical effort and
technical skill was 0.417 for general surgery and only 0.141 for radiology.
8
Let t  represent medical treatment. Higher levels of t denote a higher intensity or
number of services. A patient's benefits from treatment depend upon both the level of
treatment, t , and the physician's efforts,  1 e  and  2 e . Let  ) , , ( 2 1 e e t F  denote the
(monetary equivalent) of treatment benefits. As emphasized by MM, provider effort may
complement or substitute for intensity of medical treatment. To capture some patient role
in deciding on a course of treatment, assume, following MM, that patients choose
treatment quantity t . The patient may choose, for example, whether or not to return for a
follow-up visit or undergo a recommended procedure. The patient’s choice is informed
and influenced by provider efforts and by the required co-payment, b . For example,
provider effort in improving amenities of care will likely induce the patient to choose
more treatment (for any given co-payment). Effort to improve technical quality may also
lead to increased demand for services.  Patient responsiveness to these two different kinds
of effort may differ.  The provider may also engage in various cost-control tasks; such
efforts plausibly would substitute for formal treatment. Better coordination of care, for
example, could decrease duplicative tests or procedures.  Provider allocation of effort
between amenities, technical quality, and cost control may be influenced by financial
incentives.
The timing in the model is as follows: The payer (e.g., health plan) determines the
provider payment system and patient co-payment level.  Providers then choose effort
levels, and patients choose treatments in response. Finally, expenses are incurred and
payments made. For simplicity we follow MM in assuming full patient information when
choosing treatment quantity.
                                                                                                                                                
7 To facilitate comparison with MM’s results, we follow MM’s notation.
8 Interestingly, for several specialties (e.g., general surgery, pathology) the estimated work equation
exhibits (slightly) increasing returns to scale: doubling all of the efforts--mental, physical, stress, time--
would more than double the total amount of work (disutility).7
Consider first the patient's choice of treatment. A patient must pay co-payment b
per unit of treatment, so the marginal cost of t  for the patient is b . A patient weighs this
cost against the marginal benefit from treatment,  ) , , ( 2 1 e e t t F .  The first order condition
for the patient choice of treatment quantity will define treatment as a function of provider
efforts:
b e e t t = ) , , ( 2 1 F ) , ( 2 1 e e t ￿ . (1)
The function  ) , ( 2 1 e e t  embodies the patient’s reaction to the provider’s choice of efforts.
The provider, foreseeing patient responsiveness to quality improvement, cost control, and
other tasks, will in turn take this reaction function into account when choosing how much
effort to allocate to each task.
The provider is assumed to choose effort levels primarily to maximize net
revenue. (Professional ethics may also influence choice of effort levels, either through the
shape of the cost-of-effort function G(.) or through modification of the objective function,
as discussed below).  The insurer or health plan pays the provider a prospective payment
r  (net of any fixed costs), plus a reimbursement per service of d (positive or negative)
above variable cost c. In other words, the fee per service is  c + d . A fee-for-service (FFS)
payment system with a positive profit margin per service would be represented by r =0
and  c c > + d  (i.e.,  0 > d ). Any payment system with  c c < + d  (i.e.,  0 < d ) denotes
supply-side cost sharing. Flat prospective payment corresponds to r >0 and  0 = + c d
(i.e.,  c - = d ).
The provider would like to maximize revenue, which may depend upon treatment,
less the cost of treatment and the cost of effort. Thus, the provider seeks to maximize
( ) ) , ( 2 1 e e t t d r G c c - - + + .  For simplicity, assume the provider reports the number of
services (i.e., files claims) truthfully.
9  Then net reimbursement per service will be
( ) t t d c c - + , or simply dt . The payment margin d  captures a provider's treatment-
based financial incentives. If the payment margin is positive (negative), net revenues
increase (decrease) in treatment.
                                                
9 See MM for a relaxation of this assumption in the single-task context.8
The provider chooses efforts in light of how they influence patient choice of
treatment:  ) , ( 2 1 e e t t = . The provider therefore seeks to maximize net revenue according
to the following program:
{ } ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1
, 2 1
e e e e dt r
e e
G Max - +
> <
. (2)
This objective function leads to symmetric first order conditions, where subscript i refers
to the partial derivative with respect to effort i [i=1,2]:
1 1 G = dt , and (3)
2 2 G = dt . (4)
The provider invests in each effort up to the point where the marginal gain in
reimbursement equals the marginal effort cost.
10 The marginal reimbursement benefit will
be either additional fee-for-service revenue or avoided cost-sharing liability.
11  More
specifically, the left hand sides of the first order conditions will be positive in two cases:
the payment margin is positive ( 0 > d ) and the effort induces more treatment ( 0 > e t ),
or the payment margin is negative ( 0 < d ) and the effort substitutes for treatment
( 0 < e t ).  For example, if effort to increase quality of care encourages patients to utilize
more services, fee-for-service payment financially rewards providers for investing in
quality-improving effort.  In contrast, if cost control reduces demand for formal
treatment, then supply-side cost sharing (such as capitation) creates incentive to control
cost.
12  If both quality improvement and cost control are desirable, however, there will be
problems setting the single payment parameter to induce optimal levels of both kinds of
effort.  Fee-for-service may induce quality investments but encourage little or no attention
to cost control; supply-side cost sharing rewards cost control but not quality
improvements.
                                                
10 Equations (3) and (4) are comparable to MM equation (7).
11 This simple model abstracts from other factors influencing choice of efforts, such as malpractice costs.
12 In many cases the incentives facing a salaried provider will parallel those of a capitated provider.  A
salaried provider is “at risk” for effort associated with treatment and sacrifices savings of on-the-job leisure,
much as a capitated provider is at risk for the costs of treatment and sacrifices residual monetary savings.9
These simple first order conditions therefore illustrate that when providers may
engage in various kinds of noncontractible efforts, reliance on a single policy instrument--
treatment-based payment--cannot in general give incentive for appropriate levels of each
effort.  This is a health economics example of a more general phenomenon: to reach
multiple targets, the number of policy instruments should be no less than the number of
targets.
13 If policy targets include appropriate levels of both quality enhancement and cost
control, then the single policy instrument of net reimbursement per service needs to be
supplemented with an additional policy instrument. Perhaps separate payment
arrangements are possible for different dimensions of treatment or for different tasks that
health care providers must perform. Other potential policy instruments include minimum
quality standards, selective contracting, competition, and reputational effects.
14  The
range of instruments will be constrained by the fundamental noncontractibility of many
aspects of quality health care.  Payment rewarding measurable aspects of quality such as
through "quality report cards," for example, gives incentive to allocate effort to those
measured aspects of quality at the expense of other dimensions of quality.
The comparative statics of the two-effort model help to clarify when
noncontractibility of effort may prevent a single treatment-based payment instrument
from simultaneously achieving target levels of two provider efforts. Assume that the first
order conditions are necessary and sufficient to solve the provider’s maximization
problem. Then it can be shown that the comparative statics with respect to the payment
margin d  are
[ ] ( )
H
G G 12 12 2 22 22 1 1 - + - -
=
¶




                                                
13 See, for example, Tinbergen (1991), who notes that "to solve a [quantitative] problem the number of
equations has to be equal to the number of unknowns. It follows that the number of instruments must be
equal to the number of targets.  Exceptions to this rule are possible only if the structure of the equations is
abnormal"  (p. 35).
14 Some other contributions to the payment theory literature can also be understood in terms of the
instruments-targets approach. For example, MM find that competition can expand the set of implementable
efforts beyond that achievable by using the single payment margin instrument alone. Encinosa (2000)
investigates payment systems when provider firms can choose three different organizational forms (pooling,
specialization, and segmentation); this introduces an additional efficiency target, the socially desired
organizational form.  He finds that additional policy instruments, such as a minimum quality standard or10
[ ] ( )
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H is the Hessian, positive by the second-order sufficient condition for maximization.
15
The terms in brackets are also signed by the second-order conditions (and are negative).
The signs of the comparative statics depend upon several factors, including
whether each effort is a complement or substitute to treatment; how they interact when
the patient chooses treatment; and whether the efforts are complements or substitutes in
the provider's cost-of-effort function.  The possible combinations are summarized in
Table 1 as six basic cases (defined by assumptions on  1 t ,  1 t , and  12 G ), with five sub-
cases for each (depending upon the signs of  12 t , the payment margin, and ( ) 12 12 G - dt ).
The impact of a change in the payment margin on effort can be decomposed into
two effects, the "direct" effect and the "multitasking effect". These correspond to the first
and second terms in the comparative statics, respectively. The direct effect captures the
direct impact of the payment margin change on the marginal benefit of exerting effort.
The multitasking effect then takes into account how the change in one effort will impact
the marginal benefit and marginal cost of the other effort (through  12 G  and  12 t ).
Consider first the "direct effect". When treatment and effort are complements
(substitutes), the direct effect is positive (negative): increasing payment above variable
cost will encourage (discourage) efforts that complement (substitute for) treatment. For
example, the direct effect of a higher fee per service on quality enhancement effort would
be positive if quality enhancement encourages patients to demand more treatment. A
provider who exerts quality enhancement effort will benefit from increased demand for
services, and that higher demand will translate into higher revenues when the profit
margin per service increases. In contrast, the direct effect of a higher profit margin per
service will be to discourage provider efforts that substitute for treatment, such as cost
control.
                                                                                                                                                
risk-adjusted cost-based payments (i.e., separate payment margins for high and low risks), are necessary to
achieve the multiple efficiency targets.
15 The expression for the Hessian is  [ ][ ]
2
12 12 22 22 11 11 ) ( G G G H - - - - = dt dt dt .11
When the two efforts do not otherwise interact, either in the provider cost-of-
effort function or in the patient's treatment-responsiveness function (i.e.,  0 12 = G  and
0 12 = t ), then there is no additional "multitasking effect". The second term in (5) or (6) is
0. The sign of the comparative static will depend entirely on whether the effort is a
complement or substitute to treatment. This single-task setting is summarized in MM
Proposition 1: when treatment and effort are complements, effort is above zero when the
payment system is fee-for-service (FFS); when effort and treatment are substitutes, effort
is above zero under supply-side cost sharing.
When providers engage in multiple tasks and the model recognizes that these
tasks may interact, the effect of a payment margin change on provider behavior is more
subtle and complex. In the multitasking model summarized in Table 1, the comparative
statics, when determinate, follow the sign of the "direct effect."  The "multitasking effect"
in some cases reinforces, and in others offsets, the direct effect.  In an extreme case, the
multitasking effect could outweigh the direct effect, leading to a result contradicting
standard theory (e.g., countering MM Proposition 1).
In some special cases, when the multiple tasks relate to each other in specific
ways, there is a straightforward extension of the single-task results to the multitasking
setting. If both efforts either complement or substitute for treatment (i.e.,  1 t  and  2 t  are of
the same sign) and are complements in provider effort ( 12 G <0), then multitasking effects
will generally reinforce the direct ("single task") effects. When treatment and both efforts
are complements, effort levels are above zero when the payment system is FFS (Case
1.1); when both efforts and treatment are substitutes, effort levels are above zero under
supply-side cost sharing (Case 3.1).
If a provider has motivations beyond pure net-revenue-maximization, the results
are less stark. A physician who cares about patients may exert effort to improve quality
even when financial incentives, such as from capitation payment, would suggest that the
quality effort level should be zero. The following section describes the impact of
professional ethics or "agency" for patients more formally. Here, however, we already
make use of these results by assuming that providers may exert positive levels of efforts12
even when not in their financial best interest to do so.
16 Changes in payment incentives
will affect efforts on the margin by encouraging a higher or lower level compared to the
"professional norm" (rather than zero).
To illustrate the channels of impact from an increase in the payment margin,
Table 2 traces out the direct and multitasking effects under different scenarios. We will
here summarize only two illustrative cases highlighted in Table 2. First, consider two
tasks or efforts that both complement treatment (Case 1). Perhaps  1 e  represents technical
quality improvement and  2 e  represents better amenities for consumers.  Assume that
these two kinds of effort are complementary to treatment in the sense that higher technical
quality and better amenities will each individually increase utilization. Then the direct
effect of increasing the payment margin will be to induce positive levels of both kinds of
effort, or effort above and beyond some minimum professional standard.
17 If this direct
effect dominates, fee-for-service payment will reward improvement in both technical
quality and amenities.
18  The fact that  1 e  and  2 e  are complements in provider effort
serves to reinforce the direct effect, because a higher level of one effort reduces the
marginal cost of the other. A second multitasking channel of impact, through patient
treatment responsiveness to the other effort, may either reinforce or offset the direct effect
(see Table 2).
In many circumstances, providers engage in tasks with differing relationships to
treatment: some tasks complement, and others substitute for, billable treatments (Cases 2
and 5). For example, let  1 e  continue to represent technical quality improvement, but  2 e
represent cost control effort that substitutes for treatment. In this case, the direct effect of
                                                
16 For example, the cost-of-effort function G(.) could be negative over some initial range of effort, so that
the provider gains utility from exerting a certain “norm” of effort on behalf of patients. Normalizing these
effort levels and their associated G(.) to zero, (3) and (4) would describe the marginal benefit and marginal
cost of deviating from the professional “norm.”
17 Consider the effect of increasing d  in (3) and (4): the marginal benefit (LHS) of both increases, so that
the chosen effort levels both increase.
18 Note, however, that the provider will choose how much effort to devote to improving amenities versus
technical quality, according to patient responsiveness and reimbursement benefit; a higher fee per service
could induce larger investments in amenities but little extra effort in technical quality improvement. More13
increasing the payment margin is to encourage quality improvement and discourage cost
control. Multitasking effects could dampen or even potentially overturn these direct
effects.
Suppose that quality improvement and cost control are substitutes in the
provider’s effort function (Case 2). Then one multitasking effect arises because the two
efforts compete for provider attention, and therefore a higher level of one makes the other
more onerous. A higher level of quality effort will increase the marginal "work" disutility
of cost reduction, reinforcing the direct effect of discouraging cost control effort.
A second multitasking effect arises if  0 12 „ t , and its direction will depend on
whether the payment margin is positive (FFS) or negative (e.g., capitation). Suppose that
0 12 > t , which means that the marginal treatment response to quality is higher for higher
levels of cost control, or, alternatively, the marginal treatment reduction associated with
cost control is less for higher levels of quality. Consider FFS (Case 2.2). Then a higher
level of quality improvement will elicit a smaller demand response to cost control (a
smaller negative number for  0 2 < t ), which in turn boosts the marginal benefit of cost
control effort and encourages cost control.  This latter effect offsets the direct effect,
which was to discourage cost control effort. If in contrast the payment margin is negative
(Case 2.3), the original marginal financial benefit of quality effort is negative, because
enhanced quality leads to more treatment expense coming out of the fixed (capitation)
payment. Increasing the payment margin in this case reduces the degree of supply-side
cost sharing. The direct effect is still to encourage quality enhancement and discourage
cost control.  But now the higher level of quality effort will also reduce the marginal
benefit of cost control effort by eliciting a smaller demand response to cost control. This
treatment-responsiveness multitasking effect now reinforces, rather than offsets, the direct
effect and the cost-of-effort multitasking effect, which both discourage cost control.
In short, the overall impact of increasing the payment margin will depend not only
on direct financial incentives but also on how the provider and patient respond to the
incentive to reallocate efforts among the diverse tasks associated with quality health care.
                                                                                                                                                
generally, the actual levels of  1 e  and  2 e  will depend on which effort the provider finds least costly over
what range of treatment and effort.14
The single policy instrument of treatment-based payment cannot in general achieve
multiple targets. Given the complexity of modern medicine, almost inevitably health care
professionals will engage in a greater diversity of tasks than there are viable instruments
for individually rewarding each task.
The policy implication is a simple plea for modesty: the search for the most
sophisticated, "fine-tuned" incentive system, allowing use of high-powered incentives for
all dimensions of wanted performance, is akin to the search for the Holy Grail.
Ultimately we must rely to a greater or lesser extent on the professional discretion of
providers to allocate their time and efforts according to the needs of each patient. Lower-
powered treatment-based incentives (such as mixed payment or partial capitation) avoid
extreme financial rewards for distorted effort allocations.
Additional instruments--paying separately for certain aspects of treatment,
imposing minimum quality standards, fostering competition, etc.--may make achieving
multiple targets easier. But each instrument or policy will also potentially introduce
additional complications.
19 In the instruments-targets framework, professional ethics or
provider fidelity to patient interests can be viewed as a potent instrument, in the sense that
an appropriate "level" can help to achieve multiple targets simultaneously, with few
adverse side-effects.
20
The remainder of the paper will focus on one increasingly popular policy
instrument in many health systems, fostering competition among providers. Such
competition can help to induce provider efforts, but not all such rewarded efforts are
desirable. For example, given some amount of supply-side cost sharing, providers benefit
financially from competing to attract the healthy and avoid the sick, known as risk
selection. The next section examines more directly the issue of how provider multitasking
impacts the design of optimal payment systems (including optimal risk adjustment) when
                                                
19 For example, see Finkelstein (2000) for empirical analysis of the adverse effects of minimum benefit
regulation, focusing on the case of private health insurance for US elderly (Medigap).
20 A provider who is a good "agent" for a patient may tend to over-indulge moral hazard, but this is
counterbalanced by many socially desirable effects. The latter include less tendency to skimp on
unprofitable patients or "creamskim" profitable ones, lower likelihood of exploiting information
asymmetries through "supplier-induced demand", and greater incentive to provide high quality care
(Eggleston 2000).15
providers compete for patients. An optimal system seeks to encourage desired efforts,
while mitigating incentive for distortions such as risk selection.
III. Competition
Competition among health care providers has often been advocated as a method
for promoting efficiency, allowing consumer sovereignty in choosing providers, while
simultaneously exerting pressure on providers to deliver quality care at least cost.
Unfortunately, provider competition in the health sector is complicated by the limited
ability of consumers and payers to monitor and contract upon various dimensions of
provider effort or quality of care.  As is well known from the theory of multitasking,
rewarding one kind of effort will often lead to distortions in other kinds of effort
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). In health care the externalities associated with
inefficient forms of provider competition, such as risk selection, can call into question the
desirability of introducing strong market forces in this sector.
The following simple model illustrates this policy dilemma.  The point is
straightforward: whereas competition can create incentives to exert costly effort, not all
such efforts are socially desirable.  In particular, the fact that patients differ from one
another can make it profitable for providers to shun the sickest, an incentive that is
exacerbated by competition without risk adjustment.  Indeed, an optimal risk adjustment
mechanism itself must take into account the fact that providers exert multiple efforts, and
any systematic profits or losses associated with imperfect risk adjusters will affect
provider efforts.
To understand the interaction of payment incentives with competition, we will
first abstract from the multiplicity of health services, patient types, and provider efforts.
Consider a simple extension to the above model of provider choice of effort, focusing on
a single dimension of effort e , such as quality improvement.  Providers compete to
attract patients, and higher quality attracts more patients, perhaps through enhanced
reputation for quality care. Demand  ) (e D  is therefore an increasing function of effort:16
) (e D¢ >0. Abstract from any other demand response.
21 Exerting effort causes disutility
) (e G , increasing in effort.
The provider's objective is to maximize total net revenue from a panel of patients,
less effort costs:  [ ] ) ( ) ( e dt r e G D - + . The first order condition for choice of effort
balances the effort cost of quality improvement against the marginal benefit of attracting
more patients, who are, at least in expectation or on average, profitable
22:
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( e e dt r e G D G D ¢ = - + ¢ . (7)
This condition describing provider choice of effort can be re-written as
e





















This shows that an increase in the elasticity of demand with respect to effort,  e , D e  (i.e.,
competition), leads to a decrease in the ratio of net payment to effort cost--the left hand
side of (8), indicating that quality effort has increased.  Intuitively, more competition
elicits more patient-attracting effort.
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Increasing the payment margin per service leads to increased effort, since that will attract
more patients and therefore more revenue.  The response to payment is larger for more
                                                
21 In particular, assume that treatment for a given condition is contractible (e.g., guideline treatment), not
chosen by the patient, and abstract from the fact that patients' inability to re-trade health services endows
providers with the ability to set treatment away from guideline level (McGuire 2000).
22 If discrimination among patients is possible, the provider will have incentive to offer zero discretionary
quality to unprofitable patients; see Ma (1994) and Chung and Meltzer (2000).
23 Compare McGuire 2000, equation (3.11'), p.489, and Chung and Meltzer 2000, equation (4), p.10.17
complex and more potentially profitable services. An increase in the "work"--marginal
effort cost--of quality,  e G , leads to less responsiveness of effort to payment incentives.
What we wish to focus on here is the interaction of competition with payment
incentives.  It can be shown that the responsiveness of quality effort to payment is





































>0.   (10)
An increase in the competitive pressure on a provider increases that provider's patient-
pleasing efforts and increases the provider's responsiveness to profitability of the patient.
This simple model focuses on a single quality effort. The result that competition
reinforces financial incentives in effort choice, however, is more general. If the provider
can target effort to attract specific kinds of patients, increased competitive pressure will
increase the incentive to over-provide discretionary quality to profitable patients. Provider
competition therefore exacerbates incentives of high-powered payment to discriminate
against high cost (or low profitability) patients.
24
These results also point to the importance of multitasking when analyzing the
effects of payment incentives and competition on provider behavior. We can see from (9)
that the responsiveness of effort choice to payment incentives is negatively impacted by
an increase in the marginal disutility of effort,  e G . Suppose two kinds of efforts compete
for provider time and concentration.  Then increasing one will increase the marginal cost
of the other.  If patients are more responsive to one kind of effort than another (e.g.,
“patient-pleasing quality effort” vs. “upgrading technical skill”), then a provider has
added financial incentive to substitute away from the latter and into the former. If such a
re-allocation of provider effort is socially undesirable, lowering the intensity of financial
incentives can mitigate this adverse effect of provider competition.
                                                
24 Chung and Meltzer (2000) show a similar result, and use evidence from California hospital admissions in
the 1983 to 1993 period to show that competition is associated with lower costs after the introduction of
prospective payment, especially among patients with the highest costs.18
Multitasking in Competing Managed Care Plans
To illustrate how multitasking influences the patterns of efforts that a provider
will undertake when providing different services to heterogeneous patients, and what this
implies about optimal risk adjustment, this section develops a multitasking extension of
the managed care model of Frank, Glazer and McGuire (2000) [hereafter FGM]. The
model describes consumer choice of health plan, and how plan management has incentive
to respond by attempting to restrict access to services that attract unprofitable patients.
The actual effectiveness in restricting access will depend upon clinician efforts. We
generalize the FGM model to include professional ethics, supply-side cost sharing, effort
costs, and a travel-cost parameter to capture market competitiveness.
Our extension of FGM can illustrate that (1) the higher the degree of supply-side
cost sharing (s), the greater the incentive to distort service-specific qualities to select good
risks (Newhouse 1996); (2) increased competitive pressures exacerbate selection
incentives; (3) the greater the degree of “agency” on behalf of patients (a ) or the higher
the effort costs, G(q), the smaller the selection distortion; and (4) risk adjustment can be a
powerful policy instrument for achieving targets of efficient provision without selection
distortions, but should also take account of efficiency targets for provider efforts and
multitasking. The FGM model emerges as a special case of that presented here, the case
of a pure profit-maximizing provider paid flat capitation who can ration services
efficiently at no resource or effort cost.
Following FGM, assume consumers value a health plan according to spending on
care that they will receive if they join that plan and an individual-specific non-service
component of utility,  i m , which we will interpret as the "distance" to the nearest
competitor. Let  ij m represent the spending on health service j given to individual i if she
joins the plan, and  ) ( ij ij m v represent the increasing and concave utility individual i
derives from that spending. Total service-related utility from joining the plan is then19
captured by  ￿ =
j
ij ij i i m v m v ) ( ) ( . Define c>0 as travel cost per unit distance, so that  i cm
is the travel cost of individual i to the nearest competitor.
25
Let  i u represent consumer i's utility from joining the next-preferred plan.
Consumer i will choose the health plan if  i i i i c u m v m + > ) ( , or if 
c




Since the plan does not know each individual's i m  but does know the cumulative
distribution from which it is drawn,  ( ) i i m F , the plan considers the probability that
individual i will join it to be









































= = >0.  A decrease in c corresponds to an increase in competition
and a stronger demand response to changes in spending.
The plan provides various health care services, indexed by j. The model of
managed care adopts the shadow price approach first used by Keeler et al (1998).  The
health plan sets a “shadow price”  j q for access to health service j such that “the patient
must 'need' or benefit from services above a certain threshold in order to qualify for
receipt of services” (FGM, p.836)
26:
j ij ij q m v = ¢ ) ( . (12)
 FGM assume that the provider chooses the shadow price directly, but then
suggest that this is reflective of a more general framework in which there is a “division of
                                                
25 The “travel cost” between two plans could also represent differences in consumer tastes and/or premium
differentials across plans.  A decrease in c would then capture increased competitiveness by lowering plan
switching costs, which could take the form of lower premium differentials for similarly attractive benefit
packages and less costly search, as well as lower travel costs.
26 This framework is similar to a menu-setting approach in which a plan sets a menu of services, and a price
of each service, to maximize a given objective function; see Olmstead and Zeckhauser (1999).20
responsibility between the 'management'…and 'clinicians'”: “cost-conscious management
allocates a budget or a physical capacity for a service. Clinicians working in the service
area do the best they can for patients given the budget by rationing care so that care goes
to the patients that benefit most” (FGM, p.836). FGM abstract from any resource costs
associated with implementing (enforcing) rationing, or any inefficiency from less-than-
fully efficient rationing of services. Yet a provider must expend diagnostic, evaluation
and management effort to allocate patients efficiently across rationed services. This effort
is unlikely to be uniform across services.
Departing from FGM, therefore, we assume that implementing a shadow price  j q
requires provider effort, which causes disutility  ) ; ( 1 - j j q q G , increasing in the shadow
price. G(q) represents any effort associated with “management” to reduce spending, e.g.,
from the excessive amount of spending preferred by fully insured patients. In other words,
more stringent rationing cannot be implemented efficiently without increasing provider
effort. The effort cost of rationing service j will also depend on the effort necessary to
ration other services ( 1 - j q ), just as in the multitasking model presented earlier.
There are several natural interpretations of G(q), the “effort cost of efficient
rationing.” For example, to implement a given set of shadow prices, the plan management
must rely upon providers to exert effort to obtain information on patient-specific “needs”
and use clinical judgment and experience in allocating patients in such a way so as to
meet the plan's spending targets for different services. The relationship between budget
stringency and effort needed to implement efficient rationing is unlikely to be linear.
Acting as “gatekeeper” to services is relatively easy when the threshold for use of the
service is low, but the incremental effort required to ration heterogeneous patients
efficiently across services almost surely increases for tighter and tighter budgets (G”>0).
An alternative interpretation of the effort cost associated with rationing would be
the inefficiency resulting from imperfect allocation of patients across services.  In the
extreme, a “lazy” provider operating under a fixed budget could offer the same average
level of spending on each service to all patients. This lack of effort would cause
inefficiency from mismatching of services to patients and, for a given service, over-21
spending for less severe cases and under-spending for more severe cases.
27 Pollack and
Zeckhauser (1996) examine how rational gatekeepers respond to the incentives of fixed
budgets in a dynamic framework, showing that a doctor will provide access to a service as
long as the discounted expected benefit to the patient exceeds the option value of a later
referral to that service.  Even homogenous, individually rational gatekeepers
will fail to produce the social optimum for at least two reasons:
• Gatekeepers will tend to hoard their budgets early on, for fear of
running out later. So in early periods, care is not dispensed even
when the benefit to patients exceeds the social cost.
• Individually-optimal strategies produce socially wasteful “spend-
downs” toward the end of each budget cycle (Pollack and
Zeckhauser 1996: 650).
The opposite may occur if providers consider their budget constraint “soft.”. A provider
could allow all patients access at a relatively low threshold early in the budget period
(e.g., at the beginning of the fiscal year). The provider would then either have to deny
access to patients towards the end of the period, or secure an increase in the budget to
cover end-of-period cases.  The shadow price framework of FGM implicitly assumes that
the plan can credibly commit to a hard budget constraint (Kornai 1980), and will not give
in ex post to requests for more expenditure, even if severely ill patients are denied vital
services.
Avoiding these dynamic inefficiencies of fixed budgets is likely to require even
more effort if providers are innately heterogeneous. Differences among clinicians in the
estimation of who would benefit from a service could stem from practice style
differences, which are known to be significant. Some degree of provider profiling and/or
peer feedback and monitoring is likely to be needed to enforce consistent standards for
threshold “need” before patients are granted access to specific services.  Such profiling
and monitoring systems involve resource costs.
                                                
27 Ma (2000) analyzes the effects of public-sector rationing on incentives for private-sector cost reduction.
In Ma’s model, efficient rationing improves private sector cost incentives, but random rationing does not.
Although his model abstracts from effort costs of efficient rationing, the distinction between random
rationing and efficient rationing is similar to the argument that efficient rationing requires provider effort. If
a provider simply allocates patients access to a service randomly, by giving each patient in a given category
the same probability of receiving the service, then the provider conserves diagnostic and patient allocation
effort but undermines efficient allocation of the budget for that service.22
Moreover, when individual clinicians are called upon to ration care by allocating
patients to treatments, they have power over patients.  Note that the required allocation is
according to a patient's capacity to benefit, which may correspond only imperfectly, if at
all, to a patient's willingness and ability to pay for additional services.  Indeed, the idea of
efficient rationing to constrain ex post moral hazard requires some conflict between the
provider and patient (Ellis and McGuire 1990). This creates an incentive for patients to
voice their different willingness to pay through under-the-table payments directly to the
relevant provider(s).  Although such payments do not seem to be much of a factor in US
managed care, they are pervasive in many systems that restrict patient choice, particularly
in developing and transitional economies.  Frequently patients who have personal
connections to clinicians receive preferred access.  Some monitoring of provider behavior
may be necessary to combat these tendencies, and increasingly so the more stringent the
rationing to be implemented.
These interpretations of the effort cost of efficient rationing are not mutually
exclusive. The effort costs G(q), assumed to be increasing and convex, could be some
combination of all the above factors.
In addition to taking account of these direct effort costs of rationing, health plans
will also respond to financial incentives and consumer preferences when choosing a
pattern of shadow prices for various health services. Payment for each patient takes the
form of a fixed pre-payment (capitation) ri  plus reimbursement of (1- sj)mij  for each
service j . The health plan therefore is at risk for the proportion of spending sjmij, and s
denotes the degree of supply-side cost sharing, potentially different for each kind of
service. A fully capitated plan would receive a positive ri per enrollee and be fully liable
for costs of care:  j s j " =1 . If capitation payments are risk adjusted, ri will differ
according to the risk adjusters (such as age, sex, and diagnoses) of individual i included
in the risk adjustment mechanism.
Expected net revenues will depend upon demand for services, the degree of
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Define pi(q) as the plan's gain or loss for individual i,
￿ - - =
j
j ij j i i q G q m s r q ) ( ) ( ) ( p .  Unprofitable enrollees are those for which pi < 0.
Which consumers are unprofitable will depend on the level of the (possibly risk adjusted)
payment, the degree of supply-side cost sharing, and the effort required to ration services
efficiently for those patients.  The health plan can discourage unprofitable consumers
from enrolling in the plan by rationing services valued by those consumers more
stringently. If the health plan is at risk for some of the costs of care for service j (sj > 0),
the plan will want to balance the marginal financial benefit of increasing the shadow price
( 0 > ¢ - ij jm s ), which reduces spending, against the associated effort cost and the
possibility of discouraging enrollment of profitable consumers.  A plan whose providers
care about patient benefits as well as profits will need to take account of this “agency”
relationship as well when endeavoring to ration services.
Let the degree of provider “agency” on behalf of patients, or fidelity to patient
interests, be denoted by a . Health plan management will need to take clinicians’ agency
on behalf of patients into account when setting shadow prices (e.g., in order to recruit and
retain quality clinicians). The health plan therefore maximizes an objective function that
includes not only expected profits but also agency weight a   on patient valuation of
treatment benefits:




ij ij j ij j i
i






￿ ￿ + - - ￿ = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( . (14)
FGM analyze the case of a pure profit maximizer (a = 0) paid on a flat capitation
basis (s = 1) who can ration efficiently at no effort cost ( 0 ) ( ” q G ).  In that case, (14)
reduces to p(q(s= 1)).
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This first order condition describes the trade-off a plan makes in setting the shadow price
for each service. The marginal benefit to the plan of raising the shadow price (the left














>0  if pi < 0) and less spending per enrollee. The marginal cost of more
stringent rationing includes provider effort cost, foregone agency benefits, and possibly













<0  if  0 > i p ). As FGM
note, “the idea behind competition among managed care plans is that … the plan by
rationing too tightly will lose profitable customers -- to balance the plan’s incentive to
reduce services to the existing enrollees” (p.838).  Agency on behalf of patients
discourages selection by increasing the marginal cost of stringent rationing.
Shadow prices can exceed or fall short of the socially optimal value, which would
equate marginal benefit to social marginal cost.  Note that if the payment system does not
include any supply-side cost sharing ( 0 £ j s ), then plans will not want to restrict access
to services. This is consistent with a low threshold for use, and possibly wasteful over-
use, under FFS.
For simplicity, assume the elasticity of spending with respect to the shadow price





m e ¢ = . FGM show that, for
the special case of a pure profit maximizer (a = 0) paid on a flat capitation basis (s = 1)
who can ration efficiently at no effort cost ( 0 ) ( ” q G ) and c=1, the shadow price can be
expressed as













Generalizing to include professional ethics, supply-side cost sharing, effort costs, and a
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for  1 0 £ £ j s . (16')
The numerator of (16') represents the incentive the plan has to save money on
expected enrollees.  The higher the degree of supply-side cost sharing, the greater this
incentive and the higher the shadow price.  This corresponds to the finding in the
literature (e.g., Newhouse 1996) that increasing supply-side cost sharing increases the
incentives to invest in risk selection.  In this case risk selection is implemented through
stringent (lax) rationing--high (low) shadow prices--for services most (least) costly for the
plan to provide, i.e., services valued most by unprofitable (profitable) consumers.
The denominator of (16') represents the costs associated with rationing. These
include effort costs of efficiently allocating patients among the restricted services, and the
expected financial and professional benefits that a plan sacrifices by losing enrollees.  If
the effort cost of efficient rationing (
j q G ) increases, rationing is less stringent ( j q
declines). Higher agency on behalf of patients--greater provider fidelity to patients--
increases the forgone gains associated with quality distortions and therefore decreases
service-specific shadow price distortions. In other words, professional ethics mitigate risk
selection.  Note that when there is positive agency, there is a positive marginal cost of




=0) and no effort cost of rationing ( 0 ) ( ” q G ).  For example, (16') shows
that even if--in the absence of any demand-response discipline--plans were paid flat
capitation (with the highest incentive to risk select, s=1), there would still be little or no
distortion of shadow prices if provider fidelity to patient interests was sufficiently strong
(e.g.,a = 1).
Health plan rationing will also respond to competitive pressures.  As the cost of




increases. This increased competitive pressure will increase the sensitivity of shadow
prices to the profitability of patients, so that service-specific shadow prices increase
(decrease) for services valued by unprofitable (profitable) consumers. This captures the
impact of increased competition on providers’ incentives to skimp on care for
unprofitable patients and “cream” profitable patients through over-provision of services
they value (Ellis 1998). The selection-exacerbating effect of competition is reinforced the
greater the degree of supply-side cost sharing, since the marginal gain to skimping and
creaming is higher when the provider is at risk for a larger percentage of spending. This
corresponds to the finding of (10) above in the single-effort, single-service model.
Accordingly, an effective instrument for decreasing plan incentives to ration is to
decrease the degree of supply-side cost sharing for competing health plans. Reducing
supply-side cost sharing, however, will also discourage cost-control effort (Newhouse
1996). Indeed, as noted previously, a plan that is not at risk for spending, or receives a
positive profit margin under FFS, will not wish to discourage use of services and may
encourage wasteful over-use.
Risk adjustment of capitation payments can be a potent additional policy
instrument for mitigating selection incentives.  We can see from the above description of
shadow prices that service-specific distortions are large when the dispersion of
profitability of patients is great. Consider the effect of increasing the capitation payment
i r  for an originally unprofitable patient. This better match of prepayment to expected cost
will increase  i p (to a smaller negative number) and decrease the marginal benefit to the
plan of stringent rationing for that consumer.  Similarly, a lower capitation payment for
originally profitable consumers will decrease the incentive for “creaming” through very
low shadow prices for services those consumers value.
Glazer and McGuire (2000) use (16) to illustrate minimum variance optimal risk
adjustment.  The above analysis suggests that an additional consideration in deriving
optimal risk adjustment mechanisms should be the efficiency target(s) of appropriate
provider effort(s).  In general, risk adjusters will be imperfect, implying that risk adjusted
payments will leave providers with positive and negative profit margins for different
patients. These over-and under-payments will affect provider efforts for appropriate27
quality improvement and cost control as well as “pure” incentives to select, so that
expected cost conditional on a risk-adjuster signal (i.e., conventional risk adjustment) is
unlikely to represent the optimal risk adjustment mechanism.
28  This result is similar in
spirit to that derived by Glazer and McGuire (1997, 1999) and Encinosa (2000).
In sum, the incentives for quality distortions to select good risks will be most
acute for competing providers paid according to capitation or prospective payment, and
risk adjustment can ameliorate these incentives. Therefore, risk adjustment can be a
powerful policy instrument for achieving targets of efficient provision without selection
distortions. But the adjustment mechanism should also take account of efficiency targets
for provider efforts and multitasking. Moreover, given the multiple goals of an
appropriate payment system (e.g., low cost, high quality, zero selection distortions,
appropriate preventive effort, etc.), the single policy instrument of risk adjustment is
unlikely to be a panacea.  An additional beneficial instrument is lower-powered supply-
side cost sharing (i.e., partial capitation), possibly differing by service and/or patient
characteristics, such as separate FFS payments for specific procedures and/or outlier
payments and high-risk pools for designated high-cost patients (van Barnevald et al.
1996, Encinosa 2000). Quality assurance programs can also be helpful, as long as
policymakers bear in mind that for every measurable dimension of quality there almost
inevitably is another dimension that is fundamentally noncontractible. Appropriate
performance compensation should take provider multitasking into account.
IV.  Conclusion
Any health care professional can tell you that the daily practice of modern
medicine requires attention to diverse "tasks". Yet the theory of provider payment has
largely overlooked the question of how incentives impact providers' decisions to allocate
effort across tasks that may substitute for or complement formal treatment. This paper
extends the theory of provider payment to take account of health care provider
"multitasking," focusing on how competition among providers interacts with payment
                                                
28 I am indebted to a referee for suggesting this risk adjustment application of the multitasking framework.28
system incentives when the allocation of provider effort among multiple tasks is
noncontractible.
A simple two-effort model of health care provider multitasking illustrates that
reliance on a single policy instrument--treatment-based payment--cannot in general give
incentive for appropriate levels of multiple provider efforts. The extension to a more
nuanced model of managed care reinforces this result, and shows that competitive
pressure increases incentive for providers to exert patient-pleasing efforts and to be
responsive to the profitability of services and patients when making treatment decisions.
These competitive pressures may help to control costs, but also reward service-specific
quality distortions to attract the healthy and eschew the sick.
The policy implication is a simple plea for modesty: the search for the most
sophisticated, "fine-tuned" incentive system, with high-powered incentives for all
dimensions of wanted performance, is akin to the search for the Holy Grail. Treatment-
based payment can be supplemented by additional instruments--imposing minimum
quality standards, risk adjusting prospective payments, fostering reputational effects, etc.-
-but almost inevitably each instrument introduces distortions of its own. Moreover, given
the complexity of modern medicine and the fundamental noncontractibility of many
aspects of quality care, health care professionals engage in a greater diversity of tasks
than there are viable instruments for individually rewarding each task.
 Ultimately we must rely to a greater or lesser extent on the professional discretion
of providers to allocate their time and efforts according to patient needs. Provider
professional ethics can be a powerful policy instrument for achieving multiple efficiency
targets. Low-powered treatment-based incentives (such as mixed payment or partial
capitation) also seem to be relatively robust instruments for avoiding extreme financial
rewards for distorted effort allocations. Optimal provider payment systems, including
optimal risk adjustment, should take account of provider multitasking.29
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Table 1.  Comparative Statics for the Two-Effort Model
Assumptions Results









1.1 0 n.a. n.a. + +
1.2 + n.a. + +
1.3
+
- +/- +/? +/?




- n.a. + +
2.1 0 n.a. n.a. + -
2.2 + +/- ?/+ ?/-
2.3
+
- n.a. + -




- +/- ?/+ ?/-
3.1 0 n.a. n.a. - -
3.2 + n.a. - -
3.3
+
- +/- -/? -/?




- n.a. - -
4.1 0 n.a. n.a. ? ?
4.2 + +/- +/? +/?
4.3
+
- n.a. ? ?




- +/- +/? +/?
5.1 0 n.a. n.a. ? ?
5.2 + n.a. ? ?
5.3
+
- +/- ?/+ ?/-




- n.a. ? ?
6.1 0 n.a. n.a. ? ?
6.2 + +/- -/? -/?
6.3
+
- n.a. ? ?




- +/- -/? -/?
n.a. = not applicable: no assumption on this term is needed to sign the comparative statics.Table 2.  The "Direct" and "Multitasking" Effects of an Increase in the Payment Margin
Case /
Example






› ﬂﬁ < 2 2 12 : 0 e G G Reinforces 1.1 - 1.5
) 0 ( 2 > › d e if Reinforces 1.2 ›￿ > 2 12 : 0 t t
) 0 ( 2 < ﬂ d e if Offsets 1.3
) 0 ( 2 > ﬂ d e if Offsets 1.4
› ›ﬁ 1 1 e dt
Or  ﬂ￿ < 2 12 : 0 t t
) 0 ( 2 < › d e if Reinforces 1.5
Case 1
= 1 e Technica
l quality
improvement;




› ›ﬁ 2 2 e dt
￿
Perfectly symmetric with above, with reverse of subscripts
ﬂ ›ﬁ > 2 2 12 : 0 e G G Reinforces 2.1 - 2.5
) 0 ( 2 > › d e if Offsets 2.2 › > 2 12 : 0 t t (less negative) ￿
) 0 ( 2 < ﬂ d e if Reinforces 2.3
) 0 ( 2 > ﬂ d e if Reinforces 2.4
› ›ﬁ 1 1 e dt ￿
Or  ﬂ < 2 12 : 0 t t  (more negative) ￿
) 0 ( 2 < › d e if Offsets 2.5
› ﬂﬁ > 1 1 12 : 0 e G G Reinforces 2.1 - 2.5
) 0 ( 1 > ﬂ d e if Offsets 2.2 ﬂ￿ > 1 12 : 0 t t
) 0 ( 1 < › d e if Reinforces 2.3
) 0 ( 1 > › d e if Reinforces 2.4
Case 2
= 1 e  Quality
improvement;
= 2 e Cost
control effort
›￿ d
ﬂ ﬂﬁ 2 2 e dt ￿
Or  ›￿ < 1 12 : 0 t t
) 0 ( 1 < ﬂ d e if Offsets 2.5TUFTS UNIVERSITY
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